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Kin selection theory predicts that, where kin discrimination is pos-
sible, animals should typically act more favorably toward closer
genetic relatives and direct aggression toward less closely related
individuals. Contrary to this prediction, we present data from an 18-y
study of wild banded mongooses, Mungos mungo, showing that
females that are more closely related to dominant individuals are
specifically targeted for forcible eviction from the group, often suf-
fering severe injury, and sometimes death, as a result. This pattern
cannot be explained by inbreeding avoidance or as a response to
more intense local competition among kin. Instead, we use game
theory to show that such negative kin discrimination can be
explained by selection for unrelated targets to invest more effort
in resisting eviction. Consistent with our model, negative kin discrim-
ination is restricted to eviction attempts of older females capable of
resistance; dominants exhibit no kin discrimination when attempting
to evict younger females, nor do they discriminate between more
closely or less closely related young when carrying out infanticidal
attacks on vulnerable infants who cannot defend themselves. We
suggest that in contexts where recipients of selfish acts are capable
of resistance, the usual prediction of positive kin discrimination can
be reversed. Kin selection theory, as an explanation for social be-
havior, can benefit from much greater exploration of sequential
social interactions.
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Kin selection theory aims to understand how selection acts onsocial traits, such as altruism and selfishness, that affect the
fitness of social partners and local group members (1, 2). The
theory predicts that where animals can discriminate between
more closely and less closely related individuals within their
social group, they will preferentially direct altruism toward
closer genetic relatives and aggression toward less closely
related targets (1–3). Instances of such positive kin discrimi-
nation are taxonomically numerous and widespread (4),
whereas reported examples of negative kin discrimination are
rare (5, 6).
Contrary to the predictions of traditional kin selection theory,
we show below that banded mongooses exercise negative kin
discrimination during attempts at eviction and that this result is
not readily explained by inbreeding avoidance or local kin compe-
tition. However, a simple and very general sequential game model
of selfish behavior that takes into account the possibility of active
resistance on the part of recipients does provide a potential expla-
nation for negative kin discrimination. We first describe the model
and then test predictions of the model using our data.
Explaining Negative Kin Discrimination: A Model
Consider the interaction between two individuals, the first of
whom (player 1) may perform a selfish act at the other’s expense,
such as stealing a food item, killing offspring, or, in the case with
which we are concerned, evicting the other from the territory or
group. We suppose that this act entails some fitness cost to the
actor, denoted c1, but that the cost is outweighed by the benefit
to be gained, b1 > c1. The act, if carried out, also deprives the
recipient, player 2, of a benefit b2 that it would otherwise enjoy. If
the two individuals are related by a coefficient r, then Hamilton’s
rule tells us that the act will be favored by selection provided that
b1 – c1 – r b2 > 0. Consequently, selfishness will never be directed
toward a closer relative where it would not also be directed toward
a more distant one.
Suppose, however, that if player 1 attempts the selfish act, player
2 may then choose to resist. Resistance ensures that the act will fail;
player 1 will still suffer the cost c1 of attempting the act, but will not
enjoy the benefit b1 of success, nor will player 2 suffer the con-
sequent loss of benefit b2. At the same time, resistance entails a
fitness cost to player 2 of c2. This situation may be modeled as a
two-step, sequential game, as illustrated in Fig. 1 (see SI Models
for a population genetic formulation of the model; Fig. S1).
How does relatedness affect the outcome of this game? Ap-
plying Hamilton’s rule once again, if c2 > b2 – r b1, then the cost of
resistance to player 2 outweighs the benefit of preventing a
selfish act. Under these circumstances, player 2 will submit,
and selection once again favors performance of the selfish act
provided that b1 – c1 – r b2 > 0. If, by contrast, c2 < b2 – r b1,
then player 2 will resist, and selection consequently does not
favor the selfish act. Because a more closely related recipient
of the selfish act may prefer to submit where a more distantly
related recipient would resist, it follows that selfishness may
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be directed toward a closer relative where it would not be
directed toward a more distant one. To be precise, if we
consider two levels of relatedness, rhigh and rlow (rlow < rhigh),
then provided that
b1 − c1
b2
> rhigh >
b2 − c2
b1
> rlow,
then the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game features
targeting of a selfish act toward a recipient related to the actor
by rhigh, but not toward a recipient related by rlow. To illustrate,
suppose b1 = b2 = 1, c1 = 0.25, and c2 = 0.75; then the model
predicts that a recipient of low relatedness (rlow < 0.25) would
resist a selfish act and hence should not be targeted, whereas a
recipient of higher relatedness (0.75 > rhigh > 0.25) will submit
and so should be targeted.
Unrelated recipients are more likely to resist a selfish act,
favoring preferential targeting of more closely related victims,
when c2 (the cost of resistance) is small and b2 (the benefit to be
retained) is large. These effects are illustrated in Fig. 2. If c2 is
typically too large, or b2 too small, even unrelated recipients are
unlikely to resist, favoring indiscriminate selfishness; only for
smaller values of c2 or larger values of b2 is negative kin
discrimination predicted.
Negative Kin Discrimination in Banded Mongooses
We examine kin discrimination in the context of a conspicuous
form of intragroup aggression in cooperatively breeding banded
mongooses, Mungos mungo: the violent eviction of males and fe-
males from the group. Banded mongooses live in highly co-
operative groups with limited dispersal and varying levels of
relatedness between group members (7). In our study population
in Uganda, groups consist of around 20 adults, plus offspring, and
breed on average four times per year (8). Multiple females give
birth synchronously to a communal litter that is cared for by
members of both sexes (typically not the parents) (7). Each group
contains a cohort of multiple dominant females (median = 4) that
are older than the other females, breed more regularly and more
successfully, and aggressively evict younger females (7, 9, 10). Older
males monopolize mating with estrus females by mate guarding
them and aggressively driving away younger, subordinate males (10,
11). Previous work shows that both sexes are capable of kin dis-
crimination in the context of mating, supporting the assumption of
our model that such discrimination is possible in this system (12).
Evictions are relatively common, involve intense, targeted aggres-
sion, and result in the forcible mass exclusion of groups (median =
6 individuals) of females (female-only evictions) and, in around half
of cases, groups (median = 9 males) of males alongside them
(mixed-sex evictions) (13). These mass evictions are triggered by
high levels of intrasexual reproductive competition: females are
evicted when there are many breeding females in the group, and
males are evicted alongside females when there are many breeding
males (13). Evictions are very violent, and evictees are often left with
serious injuries as a result of the aggression they receive (Movie S1).
Among adult female banded mongooses, those more closely
related to dominant individuals of both sexes (that is, males and
females older than 3 y) in the group were more likely to be targeted
for eviction [generalized linear mixed model (GLMM), β ± SE =
9.95 ± 3.36, χ21 = 9.51, P = 0.002; Fig. 3A and Table S1]. Younger
females were also more likely to be subject to an eviction attempt
(GLMM, β ± SE = −0.003 ± 0.0005, χ21 = 39.98, P < 0.0001; Table
S1), but there was no effect of a female’s pregnancy status or
nonpregnant weight on her probability of being targeted for evic-
tion (pregnancy status, GLMM, β ± SE = −0.61 ± 0.49, χ21 = 1.63,
P = 0.20; weight, GLMM, β ± SE = 0.002 ± 0.001, χ21 = 2.59, P =
0.11; Table S1). For a subset of eviction attempts we had data on
the identity of “primary aggressors” (individuals that were recorded
as being notably more aggressive than other group members to-
ward potential evictees). Females that were more closely related to
primary aggressors were more likely to be targeted for eviction
(GLMM, β ± SE = 5.47 ± 2.87, χ21 = 3.85, P = 0.0498; Table S2).
We did not find evidence that this pattern of negative kin dis-
crimination was an attempt to reduce inbreeding between targeted
females and dominant males. We found that it was relatedness of
females to female dominants (not male dominants) that predicted
whether they were targeted for eviction. Females were more likely
to be targeted if they were more closely related to female domi-
nants (females older than 3 y: GLMM, β ± SE = 5.10 ± 2.65, χ21 =
4.07, P = 0.044; Table S3), but not if they were more closely related
to male dominants (males older than 3 y: GLMM, β ± SE = 3.69 ±
2.55, χ21 = 2.09, P = 0.15; Table S3). Behavioral data indicate that
females are almost entirely responsible for the attempts at eviction
of other females: males rarely attacked females in female-only
eviction attempts (GLMM, β ± SE = 1.80 ± 0.56, χ21 = 12.48,
P < 0.001; Fig. 3B and Table S4). Previous work indicates that
eviction attempts are triggered when the level of reproductive
competition in the group is high, not when the potential for in-
breeding is high (13), and that both sexes use kin discrimination
during mating to avoid inbreeding (12).
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Fig. 1. A sequential model of selfishness and resistance. Player 1 (blue) first
chooses whether or not to attempt a selfish act at the expense of player 2 (red);
in the event of such an attempt, player 2 then chooses whether or not to resist.
Direct fitness payoffs to both players are shown in their respective colors.
A B Fig. 2. Impact of model parameters on patterns of
kin discrimination. Here we focus on a region of pa-
rameter space in which player 1 should carry out the
selfish act when unopposed, but in which player 2 may
do best to resist (i.e., b1 – c1 – r b2 > 0). We show the
probability that, at equilibrium, the actor attempts a
selfish act, as a function of relatedness, when c2 is
drawn from a normal distribution with specified mean
and SD equal to 0.2. (A) Probability that a selfish act is
attempted at equilibrium, assuming that b1 = 1, c1 =
0.1, b2 = 0.5, and mean c2̄ as specified for the plotted
curves. (B) Probability that a selfish act is attempted at
equilibrium, assuming that b1 = 1, c1 = 0.1, c2̄ = 0.5,
and b2 is as shown in the plot.
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We also did not find evidence for the alternative hypothesis that
closer relatives are targeted for eviction because they inflict higher
costs on the reproductive success of dominants. Dominant females
did not suffer greater reproductive costs when cobreeding with
more closely related females. There was no difference in the
number of emergent pups to which dominant females gave birth
when cobreeding with more closely related vs. less closely related
females (GLMM, β ± SE = −0.06 ± 0.12, χ21 = 0.23, P = 0.63;
Table S5); nor was there a difference in the proportion of the
emergent litter that was assigned maternity to dominant individ-
uals (GLMM, β ± SE = −0.08 ± 0.14, χ21 = 0.27, P = 0.60;
Table S5).
Among males, by contrast with females, there was no effect of
an individual’s mean pairwise relatedness to dominant group
members (males and females older than 3 y) on the probability of
being subject to an eviction attempt (mixed-sex eviction attempts:
GLMM, β ± SE = 0.84 ± 3.08, χ21 = 0.07, P = 0.79; Table S1). We
found no evidence of any discrimination as to which males were
targeted for eviction (Table S1). There was also no discrimination
of any kind when we restricted our analysis to cases where the
identity of primary aggressors was known (Table S2) or when we
tested the effect of mean pairwise relatedness to same-sex and
opposite-sex dominants (Table S3). Unlike the case for female-
only eviction attempts, both males and females were primary ag-
gressors in eviction attempts directed at both sexes (GLMM, β ±
SE = 1.80 ± 0.56, χ21 = 12.48, P < 0.001; Fig. 3B and Table S4).
Testing Model Predictions
Two specific predictions of the model are (i) that selfish acts will
be directed preferentially toward closer relatives only when re-
cipients can resist and (ii) that resistance to selfish acts offered
by recipients should decrease as their relatedness to the actor
increases. After we developed the model, we tested these pre-
dictions. To test the first prediction, we examined how the effect
of relatedness varied with the age and weight of potential
evictees. Our reasoning was that younger or lighter females
should be less able to resist eviction attempts and that the pat-
tern of negative kin discrimination should therefore be more
pronounced when eviction is targeted at older or heavier indi-
viduals. We found that older females were indeed more likely to
be targeted for eviction when more closely related to dominants,
but that no such effect of relatedness was apparent for younger
females (interaction between relatedness and age: GLMM, β ±
SE = 0.008 ± 0.004, χ21 = 5.98, P = 0.014; Fig. 4A and Table S6).
The strong overall positive relationship between the probability of
being targeted for eviction and relatedness was thus driven almost
entirely by the pattern in older females (SI Methods, Fig. S2, and
Fig. 4A). A similar interaction was also found between relatedness
and weight (GLMM, β ± SE = 0.03 ± 0.02, χ21 = 5.63, P = 0.018;
Table S6). Consistent with prediction i, therefore, negative kin
discrimination was restricted to cases in which the targets of
eviction were older or heavier and potentially more capable of
offering resistance. As predicted by our model, we found no dis-
crimination on the basis of relatedness for cases where the targets
of eviction were younger or lighter and therefore likely to suffer
high costs of resistance (a high value of c2; Fig. 2A).
We found no evidence for the alternative hypothesis that the
pattern of negative kin discrimination among older females
arises because older, more closely related females inflict higher
reproductive costs on dominants (number of emergent pups
assigned to dominant female, GLMM, interaction between female
cobreeder age and relatedness to dominant female, β ± SE =
0.00002 ± 0.0002, χ21 = −0.07, P = 1.00; proportion of emergent
litter assigned to dominant female, GLMM, interaction between
female cobreeder age and relatedness to dominant female, β ±
SE = −0.00005 ± 0.0002, χ21 = 0.08, P = 0.78; Table S5).
To test further whether negative kin discrimination depends on
the capacity of recipients to resist, we examined kin discrimination
in cases of infanticide of newborn pups. Between 1 and 12 females
reproduce in each breeding attempt (14) and birth is highly syn-
chronized, with pregnant females giving birth on exactly the same
morning in 63% of cases (15). Experimental and observational
evidence suggests that asynchronous litters are often killed by
dominant females (14, 15) and that in asynchronous litters the
death of a litter in the first week after birth can be used as a proxy
for infanticide (15, 16). In contrast to the pattern of negative kin
discrimination in the eviction of adult females, there was no evi-
dence of kin discrimination in cases of presumed infanticide
(GLMM, β ± SE = −0.64 ± 2.00, χ21 = 0.10, P = 0.75; Table S7).
This is again consistent with our model, which predicts zero or
positive kin discrimination where resistance is impossible or pro-
hibitively costly (Figs. 1 and 2A).
To test the second prediction, that resistance to the selfish act
should decrease as the recipient’s relatedness to the actor in-
creases, we examined the effects of relatedness to dominants
(males and females older than 3 y) and age on the probability of
females targeted for eviction overcoming efforts to permanently
exclude them from the group. After being targeted for eviction,
some individuals leave the group, splitting into single-sex cohorts
and dispersing separately in cases where males and females are
evicted together. Other targeted individuals, however, actively
resist eviction: they persist in following the rest of the group,
despite being aggressively driven away, until efforts to expel them
eventually cease (9). Some attempts at eviction may thus be said
to “fail,” largely due to sheer persistence on the part of the po-
tential evictees. We predicted, therefore, that the probability of
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Fig. 3. Negative kin discrimination and sex-specific aggression in banded mongooses. (A) The effect of mean pairwise relatedness to dominants (males and
females older than 3 y) on the probability of a female being targeted for eviction (n = 207 females in 29 eviction attempts in five groups). The line shows the
prediction from the GLMM (±SE). (A, Inset) Eviction attempts are highly aggressive and involve biting, chasing, and wrestling (photo courtesy of Dave Seager)
(Movie S1). (B) The number of female (gray bars) and male (white bars) primary aggressors in female-only and mixed-sex eviction attempts (n = 26 eviction
attempts in six groups). The bars show the predictions from the GLMM (±SE).
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resisting eviction and regaining entry to the group should decline
with increasing relatedness to dominant individuals, particularly
among older females who are potentially more capable of
resisting eviction. There was a significant interaction between the
effect of relatedness and the age of targeted females on the
probability of regaining entry (interaction between relatedness
and age: GLMM, β ± SE = −0.03 ± 0.01, χ21 = 5.96, P = 0.015;
Fig. 4B and Table S8). Among older females, individuals that
were more closely related to dominants were less likely to regain
entry to the group, although this slope was not significantly dif-
ferent from zero (SI Methods, Fig. S3, and Fig. 4B). By contrast,
among younger females, more closely related targets were sig-
nificantly more likely to regain entry (SI Methods, Fig. S3, and
Fig. 4B).
Discussion
We have shown in very general terms that where recipients can
offer resistance, individuals can gain from targeting selfish acts at
closer, rather than more distant, relatives. In the particular case of
violent eviction in banded mongooses, this model may therefore
explain why dominant females target closer female relatives and
why such discrimination is restricted to cases where recipients can
offer most resistance. Patterns of resistance, particularly among
younger females, deviated from the model predictions, as we
discuss in more detail below. Further tests of the model could
adopt an experimental approach to manipulate resistance or the
costs and benefits of selfishness, which was not possible in our
long-term field study.
Whereas our findings offer qualified support for the predictions
of our model, it is important to consider alternative explanations
for our results. For example, there has been much recent theo-
retical interest in the possibility that local competition among kin
can erode selection for local helping and instead favor in-
discriminate harming behavior (16, 17). A prediction of these
models is that, across groups or species, rates of aggression may be
independent of relatedness (17, 18). However, these models can-
not explain the targeting of closer kin for aggression when less
closely related, but otherwise equivalent targets are available. A
second possibility is that relatedness is correlated with some other
factor influencing aggression, such as resource holding potential
(RHP) or the level of reproductive competition. For example, in
sea anemones, higher aggression among closer relatives has been
attributed to their greater similarity in RHP (5). In banded
mongooses, there is no evidence that related females are of higher
RHP or represent more of a reproductive threat. In fact, younger
females (with lower RHP and who reproduce less often) are more
likely to be targeted for eviction overall, regardless of relatedness
(Fig. 4A). Moreover, our data show that dominant females do not
suffer greater reproductive costs when they cobreed with more
closely related females (Table S5). Our findings also cannot be
explained as a nonadaptive side effect of selection to discriminate
between species of heterospecific competitor, which has been
suggested to explain negative kin discrimination in polyembryonic
wasps (6).
Finally, it has been suggested that targeting relatives for eviction
could be part of an adaptive forced dispersal strategy by breeders
to maximize metapopulation fitness in a structured population
(13). In a previous study we did not find support for this hy-
pothesis as a predictor of eviction at a group level (13). Moreover,
it is difficult to reconcile this idea with our observations of nega-
tive kin discrimination within a given eviction attempt. In classic
models such as that of Hamilton and May (19), dispersal entails
direct costs for individuals who leave their natal patch, but is
nevertheless favored because it reduces local competition among
kin. Because offspring value their own survival more than that of
their siblings, whereas parents value all their offspring equally,
offspring favor a lower dispersal rate than do their parents, and
selection can therefore favor forced eviction of young (20–22).
However, eviction by an adult of unrelated young offers equal
benefits, in terms of reduced local competition, to eviction of re-
lated young, without inflicting the direct costs of dispersal on a
relative. Hence, where adults can choose whom to evict, local kin
competition alone cannot explain why they should preferentially
target more related over less related young for expulsion. There
may be other asymmetries associated with the forced dispersal of
kin vs. nonkin, deriving, for example, from variation in local
competitive ability or variation in the bet-hedging benefits of
dispersal (23), but the effect of such variation on forced dispersal
in heterogeneous groups has been little explored theoretically or
empirically (13, 24). In banded mongooses, there is no evidence
that closer kin compete more intensely (Table S5) or that forced
dispersal of kin yields bet-hedging benefits.
We predicted that resistance to eviction should decrease with
increasing relatedness to dominants. Contrary to this prediction,
among younger females, closer relatives were more likely to
regain entry to the group than older or less closely related fe-
males (Fig. 4B). This result runs directly counter to our as-
sumption that these females are weaker and less able to force
their way back into the group and suggests that factors other than
strength or the costs of resistance may underlie the pattern by
which younger females return to the group. For example, fol-
lowing eviction, dominants may voluntarily readmit closely
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Fig. 4. Patterns of kin discrimination toward recipients capable of offering varying levels of resistance. (A) In eviction attempts, dominants (males and
females older than 3 y) exhibit negative kin discrimination only toward older females (n = 207 females in 29 eviction attempts in five groups). The lines show
the predictions from the GLMM (±SE) for younger females (dotted line and area with light shading, 25th percentile of age = 522 d) and older females (solid
line and area with dark shading, 75th percentile of age = 1,636 d). (B) Following an attempt at eviction, older females who were more related to dominants
(males and females older than 3 y) were less successful in regaining entry to the group (n = 76 females in 14 eviction attempts in four groups); this pattern was
reversed in younger females. The lines show the predictions from the GLMM (±SE) for younger females (dotted line and area with light shading, 25th
percentile of age = 446 d) and older females (solid line and area with dark shading, 75th percentile of age = 922 d).
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related, younger females that would otherwise fare very badly
outside the group. The negotiation process by which females
regain entry to the group may thus be more complex than the
simple two-step sequence of eviction and resistance assumed by
our model. Whereas our analysis shows that even a two-step
game can yield results that diverge from classical predictions, it
is likely that many negotiations in family groups may be modeled
better as a sequence of three or more steps, something we have
not attempted here.
Negative kin discrimination was evident only in eviction at-
tempts of females. In males we found no relationship between
relatedness and the probability of being targeted for eviction. This
difference between the sexes could reflect differences in the direct
fitness incentive for males and females to retain group member-
ship, which in our model is represented by the parameter b2 (Fig.
1). Females gain greater direct fitness from group membership
(i.e., higher b2) than males because there is little or no re-
productive suppression, and most females breed from the age of
10 mo (11, 25). In males, by contrast, most individuals are ex-
cluded from mating by the two or three oldest males within the
group (10). In our model, low values of b2 favor little or no kin
discrimination (Fig. 2B). A relatively low value of b2 in males
compared with females may explain why males sometimes dis-
perse voluntarily as a group, whereas females are invariably forced
to leave after being subject to violent attack (7, 13).
More generally, our model shows that incorporating even very
simple forms of behavioral anticipation can radically change the
predictions of kin selection theory. Where such anticipation is
possible, higher relatedness can lead to outcomes that are less
favorable on average for all those involved, because the threat of
resistance or punishment of selfish behavior is less credible be-
tween relatives than between unrelated individuals. Many empiri-
cal studies have shown that animals are in fact capable of adjusting
their behavior according to the anticipated responses of their social
partners in a range of contexts. Examples include signaling systems
(26), negotiation over care of offspring (27), restraint in competi-
tive growth (28), and audience effects (29). However, few have
considered the possibility that this kind of anticipation might lead
to less cooperative outcomes among closer kin. An example comes
from economic studies of human behavior in the context of joint-
liability group lending, which have found higher rates of loan de-
fault when there are more relatives within a group (30, 31), leading
to barring of remaining group members from future borrowing.
This pattern has been attributed to the difficulty of group mem-
bers imposing penalties on relatives to enforce repayment (32, 33).
Our results suggest that similar patterns might also occur in the
behavior of other species and that the influence of kinship on
aggression and cooperation within animal groups may be consid-
erably more subtle and variable than predicted by classical kin
selection theory.
Methods
Study Population and Data Collection. Data were collected from 15 groups of
banded mongooses living on the Mweya Peninsula, Queen Elizabeth National
Park, Uganda (0°12′S, 27°54′E), between September 1997 and October 2015.
For further details of habitat and climate, see ref. 8. Groups were visited every
1–3 d to record group composition, life history, and behavioral data. Individ-
uals were easily identifiable by unique shave markings on their back and were
regularly trapped to maintain these markings (34). On first capture a 2-mm
skin sample was collected from the end of the tail for genetic analyses. For
details of genetic analyses and calculating relatedness see SI Methods. Indi-
viduals were trained to step onto portable electronic scales to obtain weight
measurements. The research was conducted with permission from Uganda
Wildlife Authority and Uganda National Council for Science and Technology,
and all methods were approved by the Ethical Review Committee of the
University of Exeter.
We observed the attempted eviction of 405 individuals from eight groups
in 44 eviction attempts. Eviction attempts were conspicuous, violent events
and easy to recognize. We defined an eviction attempt to have occurred if
one or more individuals left their group for at least 1 d following a period of
intense aggression toward themselves or other group members (13, 35, 36).
In 21 of 44 eviction attempts all targeted individuals rejoined their group; in
14 attempts some targeted individuals returned whereas others did not; and
in 9 eviction attempts all targeted individuals dispersed.
Statistical Analyses. Statistical analyses were performed in R 3.3.0 (37). We
used GLMMs with a binomial error structure using a logit-link function, or a
Poisson error structure using a log link function, in the “lme4” package
(38). Poisson models were checked for overdispersion (39). In all analyses,
we assessed the significance of each fixed effect by comparing the likeli-
hood ratio of the maximal model to that of the model without the fixed
effect (38). We present parameter estimates and SEs from maximal models,
rather than removing nonsignificant fixed effects due to problems associ-
ated with stepwise model reduction (40). We did, however, remove non-
significant interactions to allow the significance of the main effects to be
tested (41).
i) Negative kin discrimination in banded mongooses. Models were fitted to male
and female data separately because not all eviction attempts involved males.
We considered adult females over 10 mo old, because females younger than
10 mo are unlikely to be regular breeders and are rarely evicted (7, 11, 25).
We fitted whether or not a female was targeted for eviction during an
eviction attempt as the binomial response variable. We included mean
pairwise relatedness to dominants in the group, which we defined as males
and females over 3 y of age, as a fixed effect. We use this age criterion for
social dominance throughout because, in both males and females, individ-
uals over 3 y of age are more likely to breed, have higher fertility, and
appear to be socially dominant (7, 10, 14, 42). In males there is a clear age-
based dominance hierarchy, evident during estrus (10, 42). In females, ex-
perimentally suppressing reproduction in older females (>3 y) results in
failure of the communal litter, whereas suppressing reproduction in younger
females (<3 y) does not (14). Older females also breed more frequently (7,
11) and produce larger litters (43). Age (days), pregnancy status (pregnant or
not pregnant), mean nonpregnant weight (grams) in the 60 d before the
eviction attempt, mean rainfall (millimeters) in the 30 d preceding the
eviction attempt, and group size (number of individuals over 6 mo) were
included as additional fixed effects. We controlled for repeated measures of
individuals, eviction attempts, and groups by including these terms as ran-
dom intercepts and fitted the model to data on 207 females in 29 eviction
attempts in five groups. To examine which males were targeted for eviction
we considered adult males over 1 y old, because males under 1 y do not sire
young (7, 42), and fitted whether or not a male was targeted for eviction
during a mixed-sex eviction attempt as the binomial response variable. We
included the same fixed and random effects as in the female model but,
instead of pregnancy status, we included the male’s breeding status
(whether or not the male had been observed mate guarding or had sired
pups in the current breeding attempt) and fitted the model to data on
177 males in 15 eviction attempts in five groups.
Aggressive interactions between targeted individuals and other group
members during eviction attempts were numerous, but systematic data on the
identity of aggressors were difficult to record. However, since 2000 we have
noted ad libitum the identity of individuals that were notably more aggressive
than other group members toward potential evictees. Data on 86 of these
primary aggressors were available for 26 eviction attempts. To investigate the
relationship between the sex of primary aggressors and the sex of individuals
targeted for eviction we fitted the number of primary aggressors in each
eviction attempt as the Poisson response variable and included the sex of the
primary aggressors, the type of eviction attempt (female only or mixed sex),
and the interaction between these two variables as fixed effects. We included
group identity and eviction attempt as random intercepts and fitted the model
to 26 eviction attempts in six groups. See SI Methods for details of analyses of
negative kin discrimination by primary aggressors, to avoid inbreeding or as a
response to reproductive competition.
ii) Testing model prediction i: The selfish act will be directed preferentially toward
closer relatives only when recipients can resist.We repeated the original analysis
investigating negative kin discrimination among females in eviction at-
tempts, but included two-way interactions between female relatedness to
dominants and age (days) and female relatedness to dominants and weight
(grams). Other fixed and random effects were as in the original analysis.
We fitted this model to data on 207 females in 29 eviction attempts in
five groups.
To test further model prediction i, we examined kin discrimination in cases
of infanticide of newborn pups. Infanticide is known to occur in this system,
but is difficult to observe directly as it typically occurs in the den. In asyn-
chronous litters, infanticide appears to be common because early life pup
mortality is strongly dependent on the pregnancy status of other females in
the group (14, 15). Pups that are born early in asynchronous litters almost
always die in the first few days after birth, whereas pups born last almost
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always survive (15). Between November 1997 and October 2015, we recor-
ded the order in which each female gave birth in an asynchronous litter (i.e.,
if she gave birth first, in the middle, or last) and whether any of her pups
survived the first week after birth. Following ref. 15, we used the presence
or absence of “babysitters” (adults left at the den to guard newly born pups)
to measure patterns of early life litter mortality. Specifically, to determine
the survival of an individual female’s pups, we considered only females who
gave birth early relative to the rest of the breeding females and for which
the failure of a specific female’s litter could be detected using cessation of
babysitting (i.e., we did not consider females who gave birth when baby-
sitting of other early-birthing females’ pups was still ongoing). A female’s
litter was determined to have survived the first week after birth if there
were still babysitters left 7 d after birth or if she was retrospectively assigned
maternity to at least one emergent pup from the communal litter following
genetic analysis. We observed 166 females that fitted the criteria outlined
above, who gave birth to 120 asynchronous litters in 15 groups. Where none
of the female’s pups survived the first week after birth, they were assumed
to have been subject to an infanticidal attack. To test whether pups are
more likely to be targeted for infanticide when mothers are less related to
female dominants in the group, we fitted whether or not each female’s pups
survived the first week after birth as the binomial response variable. We
included the mother’s mean pairwise relatedness to female dominants older
than 3 y of age, mother’s age (days), group size, and rainfall (millimeters) in
the 30 d before birth as fixed effects. We controlled for repeated measures
of mothers, litters, and groups by including these terms as random intercepts
and fitted the model to data on 57 females giving birth to 50 communal
litters in 11 groups.
iii) Testing model prediction ii: Resistance to the selfish act offered by recipients
should decrease as their relatedness to the actor increases. We fitted whether or
not a female over 10mo old that was targeted for eviction overcame efforts to
permanently excludeher from thegroupas the binomial response variable.We
considered only eviction attempts where some evictees were allowed to return
and others were not due to problems with fitting a binomial model to out-
comes that are exclusively successes or failures. We included mean pairwise
relatedness to dominants in thegroup, age (days), and the interaction between
these two variables as fixed effects.Wewere unable to include additional fixed
effects in the model due to problems with model convergence. We controlled
for repeated measures of individuals, eviction attempts, and groups by in-
cluding these terms as random intercepts and fitted the model to data on
76 females in 14 eviction attempts in four groups.
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SI Models
In the main text we analyze a simple, game-theoretical model of
selfishness and resistance. Here, we present two population ge-
netic analyses of the same situation, in which we explicitly model
the evolutionary dynamics of alleles that influence both traits.
These two models differ in the specific assumptions they make
regarding the genetic basis of selfishness and resistance and the
nature of mutation. In both cases, the two traits are under the
control of distinct (unlinked) loci, but in the first, “adaptive
dynamic” model, we assume that evolution proceeds through the
successive substitution of mutations of small effect at one or the
other locus that slightly alter the probability either of acting
selfishly or of resisting such action. In the second model, by
contrast, we assume that there are two alleles present in the
population at each locus that determine whether or not indi-
viduals act selfishly or resist and focus on evolutionary changes in
the frequencies of the possible genotypes. Both models confirm
the findings of the game-theoretical analysis.
An Adaptive Dynamic Model. We focus on a large (effectively
infinite), sexual population with nonoverlapping generations. For
simplicity, we assume haploid genetics. In each generation, adult
breeding members of the population mate at random to produce
many offspring. Members of this offspring generation then col-
lectively engage in pairwise interactions with one another. Each
offspring interacts with a single partner, and in any given pairwise
interaction, one individual is randomly assigned the role of actor
and the other the role of recipient. The actor may choose whether
or not to attempt a selfish act; if it chooses to do so, the recipient
may choose whether or not to resist. An individual’s genetically
determined strategy specifies the probability of selfish action p
and the probability of resistance q. We allow, however, for a
small degree of error in implementation of actors’ choices, such
that with probability « (where 0 < « << 0.5), an individual actor
acts contrary to the behavior specified by its strategy. Individuals
(both actors and recipients) receive payoffs from this interaction
as specified in the main text: actors incur an additive cost of c1
(relative to the baseline fitness value of 1) if they act selfishly,
and recipients incur an additive cost of c2 if they resist a selfish
act (where 0 < c1, c2 ≤ 1); at the same time, actors obtain an
additive benefit of b1 if they perform a selfish act that is not
resisted, whereas recipients obtain an additive benefit of b2 unless
they fail to resist a selfish act against them. After offspring have
interacted with one another in this way, all compete for breeding
opportunities in the next generation, with probabilities of success
proportional to their payoffs, and the cycle then repeats.
To model the evolution of this population, we take an adaptive
dynamic approach, in which the behavioral strategy adopted by
members of the population is assumed to change through the suc-
cessive substitution of mutations of small effect, each of which affects
either the probability of selfish action or the probability of resistance.
Because our focus is on the impact of relatedness on the
evolution of selfishness and resistance, we suppose that offspring
may interact preferentially with kin, with whom they share a
degree of genetic similarity by virtue of common descent. The
probability that an individual and its partner share alleles at a
given locus that are identical by descent is denoted r. If, for in-
stance, interactions always involve full sibs, then r = 1/2 (com-
pared with r = 0 if interaction occurs at random within the
population as a whole). We do not explicitly model the processes
that give rise to interactions among kin, as these might take
different forms in different contexts (such as familial interaction,
preferential assortment, or limited dispersal); instead, we simply
specify the value of r.
Suppose, then, that the population currently adopts the strategy
(p, q), and consider the fate of a mutant allele that specifies a
probability of resistance qm ≡ q+ δq that differs slightly from q. Let
~p= ð1− «Þp+ «ð1− pÞ
denote the probability of a randomly chosen individual in this
population acting selfishly when the chance of error « is taken
into account and
q= fmqm + ð1− fmÞq
denote the probability of a randomly chosen individual resisting a
selfish act, given the current frequency fm of the mutant allele.
The expected payoff from pairwise interaction to an individual in
this population bearing a mutant allele is given by
wm = 1+
1
2

~pð1− ðrqm + ð1− rÞqÞÞb1 − ~pc1

+
1
2

1− ~pð1− qmÞ

b2 − ~pqmc2

,
whereas the expected payoff to an individual bearing a resident
allele is given by
wr = 1+
1
2

~pð1− ðrq+ ð1− rÞqÞÞb1 − ~pc1

+
1
2

1− ~pð1− qb2 − ~pqc2.
Following competition for breeding opportunities and random
mating, the frequency of the mutant allele in the next generation
is then given by
f ′m =
fmwm
fmwm + ð1− fmÞwr ,
implying that
Δfm ≡ f ′m − fm = fmð1− fmÞðwm −wrÞ,
i.e., that the mutant allele will increase (or decrease) in frequency
if its bearers enjoy a greater (or smaller) mean payoff from pair-
wise interaction than do bearers of the resident allele.
Now,
wm −wr =
1
2
~pδqð−rb1 + b2 − c2Þ,
which, because ~p is always positive, implies that if
c2 < b2 − rb1, [S1]
then bearers of any mutant allele that specifies an increased prob-
ability of resistance (i.e., for which δq > 0) will enjoy a greater
expected payoff than bearers of the resident allele at all frequen-
cies, and the allele will thus increase monotonically in frequency
and spread to fixation, regardless of the value of p. By contrast,
bearers of a mutant allele that specifies a decreased probability
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of resistance (i.e., for which δq < 0) will suffer a reduced payoff at
all frequencies, and the allele will thus be eliminated, again re-
gardless of the value of p. If condition [S1] is not met, then the
reverse conclusions hold true.
We conclude that when condition [S1] is satisfied, any con-
vergently stable evolutionary equilibrium must feature q = 1,
whereas when condition [S1] is not satisfied, such an equilibrium
must feature q = 0.
Now, consider the fate, if a population currently adopts the
strategy (p, q), of a mutant allele that specifies a probability of
selfish action pm ≡ p+ δp that differs slightly from p. Let
~pm = ð1− «Þpm + «ð1− pmÞ
denote the probability of a mutant individual in this population
acting selfishly when the chance of error « is taken into account,
~p= ð1− «Þp+ «ð1− pÞ
denote the probability of a resident individual acting selfishly, and
ep= fm~pm + ð1− fmÞ~p
denote the probability of a randomly chosen individual acting self-
ishly, given the current frequency fm of the mutant allele. Then
the expected payoff to an individual in this population bearing a
mutant allele is given by
wm = 1+
1
2

~pmð1− qÞb1 − ~pmc1

+
1
2

1−

r~pm +ð1− rÞepð1− qb2
−

r~pm + ð1− rÞepqc2,
whereas the expected payoff to an individual bearing a resident
allele is given by
wr = 1+
1
2

~pð1− qÞb1 − ~pc1

+
1
2

1−

r~p+ ð1− rep1− qb2
−

r~p+ ð1− rÞepqc2.
It follows that
wm −wr =
1
2
ð1− 2«Þδpðð1− qÞb1 − c1 − rð1− qÞb2 − rqc2Þ, [S2]
which, when q = 1, reduces to
wm −wr =
1
2
ð1− 2«Þδpð−c1 − rc2Þ.
Under these circumstances, therefore, bearers of a mutant allele
that specifies an increased probability of selfishness (i.e., for
which δp > 0) will suffer a reduced payoff compared with bearers
of the resident allele at all frequencies, and the mutant allele will
thus decrease monotonically in frequency and eventually be
eliminated, whereas bearers of a mutant allele that specifies a
decreased probability of selfishness (i.e., for which δp < 0) will
enjoy a payoff advantage at all frequencies, so that the mutant
allele in this case will spread to fixation. Consequently, at an
equilibrium that features resistance (q = 1), actors will refrain
from selfishness (p = 0).
When q = 0, by contrast, condition [S2] reduces to
wm −wr =
1
2
ð1− 2«Þδpðb1 − c1 − rb2Þ.
Under these circumstances, therefore, if
b1 − c1 − rb2 > 0, [S3]
then bearers of any mutant allele that specifies an increased prob-
ability of selfishness (i.e., for which δp > 0) will enjoy a payoff
advantage over bearers of the resident allele at all frequencies,
and the mutant allele will thus spread to fixation, whereas bearers
of a mutant allele that specifies a decreased probability of resistance
(i.e., for which δp < 0) will suffer a payoff disadvantage at all fre-
quencies, and in this case the mutant allele will thus be eliminated.
If condition [S3] is not met, then the reverse conclusions hold true.
We conclude that at an equilibrium that does not feature resistance
(q = 0), actors will act selfishly (p = 1) if condition [S3] is satisfied
and refrain from doing so (p = 0) if condition [S3] is not satisfied.
Because r may be interpreted as the coefficient of relatedness
between interacting offspring, these results are identical to those of
the game-theoretical model presented in the main text and lead to
the same conclusion that selfishness may be directed toward a
closer relative where it would not be directed toward a more dis-
tant one. To be precise, if we consider two levels of relatedness,
rhigh and rlow (rlow < rhigh), then provided that
b1 − c1
b2
> rhigh >
b2 − c2
b1
> rlow,
selfishness persists at equilibrium when actors interact with a re-
cipient related to them by rhigh, but not when they interact with a
recipient related to them by rlow.
A Classical Population Genetic Model. We consider a large (effec-
tively infinite), sexual population with nonoverlapping generations.
For simplicity, we assume haploid genetics. In each generation, adult
breedingmembers of the populationmate at random toproducemany
offspring. Members of this offspring generation then collectively en-
gage in pairwise interactionswith one another. Each offspring interacts
with a single partner, and in any given pairwise interaction, one in-
dividual is randomly assigned the role of actor and the other the role of
recipient. The actormay choosewhether or not to attempt a selfish act;
if it chooses to do so, the recipientmay choose whether or not to resist.
Behavior in the actor role is determined by an individual’s genotype at
the A locus; those bearing the A allele typically act selfishly, whereas
those bearing the a allele typically do not. Similarly, behavior in the
recipient role is determined by an individual’s genotype at the (un-
linked) R locus; those bearing the R allele resist a selfish act, whereas
those bearing the r allele do not. We allow for a small degree of error
in implementation of actors’ choices, such that with probability «
(where 0 < « << 0.5), an individual actor acts contrary to the be-
havior typical of its genotype. Individuals (both actors and recipients)
receive payoffs from this interaction as specified in the main text:
actors incur an additive cost of c1 (relative to the baseline fitness value
of 1) if they act selfishly, and recipients incur an additive cost of c2 if
they resist a selfish act (where 0 < c1, c2 ≤ 1); at the same time, actors
obtain an additive benefit of b1 (>0) if they perform a selfish act that
is not resisted, whereas recipients obtain an additive benefit of b2 (>0)
unless they fail to resist a selfish act against them. After offspring have
interacted with one another in this way, all compete for breeding
opportunities in the next generation, with probabilities of success
proportional to their payoffs, and the cycle then repeats.
Our focus is on the impact of relatedness on the evolution of
selfishness and resistance. We therefore suppose that offspring may
interact preferentially with kin, with whom they share a degree of
genetic similarity by virtue of common descent. The probability that
an individual and its partner share alleles at a given locus that are
identical by descent is denoted r. If, for instance, interactions always
involve full sibs, then r = 1/2 (compared with r = 0 if interaction
occurs at random within the population as a whole). We do not
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explicitly model the processes that give rise to interactions among
kin, as these might take different forms in different contexts (such
as familial interaction, preferential assortment, or limited dispersal);
instead, we simply specify the value of r.
Let fAR, fAr, faR, and far denote the frequencies of the four possible
genotypes in the population immediately before pairwise interaction
(where fAR + fAr + faR + far = 1). The probability that a randomly
chosen actor in this population acts selfishly is then given by
A= «+ ð1− 2«ÞðfAR + fArÞ,
whereas the probability that a randomly chosen recipient resists a
selfish act is given by
R= ðfAR + faRÞ.
Expected payoffs obtained by individuals of the four genotypes
are thus given by
wAR = 1+ r

−
1
2
ð1− «Þc1 + 12ðb2 − ð1− «Þc2Þ

+ ð1− rÞ
×

1
2
ð1− «Þðð1−RÞb1 − c1Þ+ 12ðb2 −Ac2Þ

wAr = 1+ r

1
2
ð1− «Þðb1 − c1Þ+ 12 «b2

+ ð1− rÞ
×

1
2
ð1− «Þðð1−RÞb1 − c1Þ+ 12ð1−AÞb2

waR = 1+ r

−
1
2
«c1 +
1
2
ðb2 − «c2Þ

+ ð1− rÞ
×

1
2
«ðð1−RÞb1 − c1Þ+ 12ðb2 −Ac2Þ

war = 1+ r

1
2
«ðb1 − c1Þ+ 12ð1− «Þb2

+ ð1− rÞ
×

1
2
«ðð1−RÞb1 − c1Þ+ 12ð1−AÞb2

,
leading to frequencies of the four genotypes among breeders of
f ′AR =
fARwAR
w
, f ′Ar =
fArwAr
w
, f ′aR =
faRwaR
w
, f ′ar =
farwar
w
,
where
w= fARwAR + fArwAr + faRwaR + farwar
denotes the mean payoff. Following random mating, the frequen-
cies of the four genotypes in the next generation (immediately
before pairwise interaction) are then given by
f ″AR = f
′2
AR + f
′
AR f
′
Ar + f
′
AR f
′
aR +
1
2
f ′AR f
′
ar +
1
2
f ′Ar f
′
aR
f ″Ar = f
′2
Ar + f
′
AR f
′
Ar + f
′
Ar f
′
ar +
1
2
f ′AR f
′
ar +
1
2
f ′Ar f
′
aR
f ″aR = f
′2
aR + f
′
aR f
′
ar + f
′
AR f
′
aR +
1
2
f ′AR f
′
ar +
1
2
f ′Ar f
′
aR
f ″ar = f
′2
AR + f
′
aR f
′
ar + f
′
Ar f
′
ar +
1
2
f ′AR f
′
ar +
1
2
f ′Ar f
′
aR.
Iteration evaluation of the above equations allows us to track
changes in genotype frequencies from one generation to the next.
Illustrative trajectories are shown in Fig. S1, which highlights
parameter values for which the system converges (from mul-
tiple initial starting conditions) to an equilibrium featuring
selfishness and nonresistance for a higher level of relatedness
(r = 0.5), but to resistance and nonselfishness for a lower level
of relatedness (r = 0), demonstrating that (as we argue in the
main text) interactions between closer kin may feature more
selfish behavior than between more distant kin or between
nonrelatives.
Beyond the above example, we can further demonstrate a close
correspondence between the results of the genetic model and of
our game-theoretical analysis from the main text. The game-
theoretical model yields three types of equilibria: (i) When
b2 − c2 – rb1 > 0, recipients resist and actors refrain from self-
ishness; (ii) when b2 − c2 – rb1 < 0 and b1 – c1 – rb2 > 0, recipients
do not resist and actors behave selfishly; and (iii) when b2 − c2 –
rb1 < 0 and b1 – c1 – rb2 < 0, recipients do not resist but actors
nevertheless refrain from selfishness. The fourth possible pure-
strategy equilibrium at which recipients resist and actors behave
selfishly is never stable.
In the genetic model, because fAR + fAr + faR + far = 1, it is
necessary to specify only three frequencies to determine the state
of the system. Below, therefore, we set far = 1 − fAR – fAr – faR and
evaluate the stability of the equilibria suggested by the game-
theoretical analysis, by calculating the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian
J =
0
BBBBBBBBB@
∂f ″AR
∂fAR
∂f ″AR
∂fAr
∂f ″AR
∂faR
∂f ″Ar
∂fAR
∂f ″Ar
∂fAr
∂f ″Ar
∂faR
∂f ″aR
∂fAR
∂f ″aR
∂fAr
∂f ″aR
∂faR
1
CCCCCCCCCA
at each candidate equilibrium point.
i) At the candidate equilibrium faR = 1, fAR = fAr = far = 0 (at
which recipients resist and actors refrain from selfishness),
these eigenvalues are
2+ b2 − «ðc1 + b2 − rb1Þ
2+ b2 − «ðc1 + c2Þ ,
2+ b2 − c1 − rc2 + «ðc1 − ð1− 2rÞc2Þ
2+ b2 − «ðc1 + c2Þ ,
2+ rb1 + ð1− rÞb2 − c1 + «ðc1 − rb1 − ð1− 2rÞb2Þ
4+ 2b2 − 2«ðc1 + c2Þ .
The equilibrium is stable if all eigenvalues are of magnitude
less than 1; considering the first eigenvalue, this yields the
necessary and sufficient condition
b2 − c2 − rb1 > 0,
identical to the condition for stability in the game-theoretical
model. In the limit as «→0 the above condition also proves suf-
ficient to ensure that the other two eigenvalues are of magnitude
less than 1.
ii) At the candidate equilibrium fAr = 1, fAR = faR = far = 0 (at
which recipients do not resist and actors behave selfishly),
these eigenvalues are
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2+ b1 − c1 + b2 − c2 − rb1
2+ b1 − c1
,
2+ rb2
2+ b1 − c1
,
2+ b2 − c2 + rc2
4+ 2b1 − 2c1
.
The first eigenvalue is of magnitude less than 1 if and only if
b2 − c2 − rb1 < 0,
the second if and only if
b1 − c1 − rb2 > 0,
conditions that are identical to those for stability in the game-
theoretical model. Moreover, these two conditions suffice to
ensure that the third eigenvalue is also of magnitude less than 1.
iii) At the candidate equilibrium far = 1, fAR = fAr = faR = 0 (at
which recipients do not resist but actors nevertheless refrain
from selfishness), these eigenvalues are
2+ b2 + «ðb1 − c1 − rb1 − c2Þ
2+ b2 + «ðb1 − c1 − b2Þ ,
2+ b1 − c1 + b2 − rb2 − «ðb1 − c1 + b2 − 2rb2Þ
2+ b2 + «ðb1 − c1 − b2Þ ,
2+ b1 − c1 + b2 − rb1 − rc2 − «ðb1 − c1 + c2 − rb1 − 2rc2Þ
2ð2+ b2 + «ðb1 − c1 − b2ÞÞ .
The first eigenvalue is of magnitude less than 1 if and only if
b2 − c2 − rb1 < 0,
whereas in the limit as «→0 the second is of magnitude less
than 1 if and only if
b1 − c1 − rb2 < 0,
conditions that are identical to those for stability in the game-
theoretical model. Moreover, in the same limit, these two
conditions suffice to ensure that the third eigenvalue is also
of magnitude less than 1.
iv) At the candidate equilibrium fAR = 1, fAr = faR = far = 0 (at
which recipients resist and actors behave selfishly), these
eigenvalues are
2+ b2 − c2 + rc2
2+ b2 − c2 − c1
,
2+ rb2
4+ 2b2 − 2c1 − 2c2
,
2− c1 + rb1
2− c1 + b2 − c2
.
Because the first of the expressions above is of magnitude
greater than 1 for all permissible parameter values, this equi-
librium is always unstable, as in the game-theoretical model.
SI Methods
Genetic Analyses and Calculating Relatedness. DNA was extracted
from tail tips and genotyped at up to 43 microsatellite loci isolated
from a variety of carnivore species, including the banded mongoose.
Genotyping was conducted following ref. 10 or (post-2010) using
multiplex PCRs (Qiagen Multiplex PCR Kit) with fluorescent-
labeled forward primers and was visualized through fragment size
analysis on anABI 3730DNAanalyzer. For full details of genotyping
methods, see ref. 12.We assigned parentage usingMasterBayes 2.51
(44), implemented in R 3.1.1 (details in ref. 12). Estimates of
pairwise relatedness were calculated from a nine-generation deep
pedigree constructed using a combination of parentage and sibship
assignments fromMasterBayes 2.51 (44) and COLONY 2.0.5.7 (45).
Full details of pedigree construction are given in ref. 12.
Analysis of Negative Kin Discrimination to Avoid Inbreeding. To in-
vestigate whether the attempted eviction of relatives was in fact
the result of inbreeding avoidance, we repeated the first analysis
of negative kin discrimination outlined inMethods, i) Negative Kin
Discrimination in Banded Mongooses, but instead of including the
mean pairwise relatedness to both male and female dominants in
the group, we used the mean pairwise to same-sex dominants
aged over 3 y and the mean pairwise relatedness to opposite-sex
dominants aged over 3 y as the measure of relatedness in sep-
arate models. All other fixed and random effects used in the
original male and female analyses remained the same. We fitted
the female models to data on 198 females in 27 eviction attempts
in five groups and the male models to data on 177 males in
15 eviction attempts in five groups.
Analysis of Negative Kin Discrimination by Primary Aggressors. To
investigate the effect of relatedness to known aggressors on the
probability of a female (or male) being targeted for eviction, we
repeated the first analysis of negative kin discrimination outlined
in Methods, i) Negative Kin Discrimination in Banded Mongooses,
but restricted our analysis to eviction attempts where we had
data on the identity of primary aggressors. In each of the female
and male models we replaced mean pairwise relatedness to
dominants in the group with mean pairwise relatedness to pri-
mary aggressors. All other fixed and random effects used in the
original male and female analyses remained the same. We fitted
the female model to data on 131 females in 19 eviction attempts
in four groups and the male model to data on 177 males in
11 eviction attempts in four groups.
Analysis to Investigate Whether Closer Relatives Inflict Higher
Reproductive Costs on Dominants. We examined whether domi-
nant females suffered higher reproductive costs when cobreeding
with more closely related females. We measured a dominant
female’s reproductive success in two ways: (i) as the number of
emergent pups in a litter to which a dominant female was
assigned maternity and (ii) as the proportion of an emergent
litter to which a dominant female was assigned maternity. For
the first analysis, we fitted the number of emergent pups to which
each dominant breeding female (females over 3 y of age) was
assigned maternity as the Poisson response variable with a log-
link function in a GLMM. We included each dominant female’s
pairwise relatedness to cobreeding females (other females that
contributed to the communal litter), the age (days) of cobreeding
females, and the interaction between these two variables as fixed
effects. We also included the dominant female’s age (days), the
number of females that contributed to the litter, and mean
rainfall (millimeters) in the 30 d before birth. We controlled for
repeated measures by including dominant female, cobreeder fe-
male, litter, and group ID as random intercepts and fitted the
model to data on 2,719 pairs of dominant females and female
cobreeders, involving 131 dominant females giving birth to
337 litters in 17 groups. This model was checked for over-
dispersion of the response variable (39). For the second analysis,
we fitted the proportion of an emergent litter to which each
dominant breeding female (females over 3 y of age) was assigned
maternity as the binomial response variable with a logit-link
function in a GLMM. We included the same fixed and random
effects as in the first analysis and fitted the model to data on
2,719 pairs of dominant females and female cobreeders, involving
131 dominant females giving birth to 337 litters in 17 groups.
Johnson–Neyman Technique to Investigate Significant Interactions.
To further investigate the nature of the significant interaction
(i) between relatedness and age on the probability of a female
being targeted for eviction and (ii) between relatedness and age
on the probability of a targeted female returning to the group
following an eviction attempt we used the Johnson–Neyman
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technique (46–48). This enabled us to evaluate the conditional
effect of relatedness on each of the respective response variables
with respect to age by calculating the region of significance and
95% confidence intervals for the marginal effect of relatedness
across all possible ages (47, 49).
i) Investigating the nature of the significant interaction between relatedness
and age on the probability of a female being targeted for eviction. Fig. S2
shows that the marginal effect of relatedness on the probability of a
female being targeted for eviction is positive for all ages and is
significantly different from zero at ages greater than 543 d. We also
performed a test of significance on the regression slopes of the
effect of relatedness on the probability that a female is targeted for
eviction for younger vs. older females to determine whether these
slopes were significantly different from zero. Using noncentered
variables and values of age plotted in Fig. 4A, the slope of re-
gression for younger females was not significantly different from
zero (age at 25th percentile = 522 d, t198 = 1.92, P = 0.057) and the
slope of regression for older females was significantly different from
zero (age at 75th percentile = 1,636 d, t198 = 3.81, P < 0.001). Using
mean-centered variables, the slope of regression for both younger
and older females was significantly different from zero (age at
mean − 1 SD, t198 = 2.11, P = 0.036; age at mean + 1 SD, t198 =
4.98, P < 0.0001).
ii) Investigating the nature of the significant interaction between relatedness
and age on the probability of a targeted female returning to the group
following an eviction attempt. Fig. S3 shows that the marginal effect
of relatedness on the probability of a female being targeted for
eviction is positive for younger females and is significantly dif-
ferent from zero at ages less than 563 d. As age increases the
marginal effect of relatedness becomes less positive (becoming
negative for older females) but is not significantly different from
zero (Fig. S3). We also performed a test of significance on the
regression slopes of the effect of relatedness on the probability of
a targeted female returning to the group following an eviction
attempt for younger vs. older females to determine whether these
slopes were significantly different from zero. Using noncentered
variables and values of age plotted in Fig. 4B, the slope of re-
gression for younger females was significantly different from zero
(age at 25th percentile = 446 d, t72 = 0.58, P = 0.026) and the
slope of regression for older females was not significantly different
from zero (age at 75th percentile = 922 d, t72 = 2.27, P = 0.56).
Similarly, using mean-centered variables, the slope of regression
for younger females was significantly different from zero (age at
mean − 1 SD, t72 = 2.38, P = 0.0056) and the slope of regression
for older females was not significantly different from zero (age at
mean + 1 SD, t72 = 0.85, P = 0.40).
Fig. S1. Evolutionary trajectories converge from multiple initial conditions to nonresistance and selfishness (fAr = 1, fAR = faR = far = 0) when r = 1/2, but to
resistance and nonselfishness (faR = 1, fAR = fAr = far = 0) when r = 0. In both cases, parameter values are otherwise identical, with b1 = b2 = 1, c1 = 0.25, c2 =
0.75, and « = 0.01.
Thompson et al. www.pnas.org/cgi/content/short/1612235114 5 of 10
300 800 1300 1800 2300 2800 3300 3800
−1
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Age (days)
M
ar
gi
na
l e
ffe
ct
 o
f r
el
at
ed
ne
ss
543
days
Fig. S2. Johnson–Neyman plot of the marginal effect of relatedness on the probability of a female being targeted for eviction for varying ages. The gray
shaded region shows the 95% confidence interval of the marginal effect of relatedness. The horizontal solid red line shows where the marginal effect of
relatedness is zero. The vertical dashed red line shows the age at which the marginal effect of relatedness is significantly different from zero (at 543 d), and the
red shaded region shows the region of significance for the marginal effect of relatedness.
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Fig. S3. Johnson–Neyman plot of the marginal effect of relatedness on the probability of a targeted female returning to the group following an eviction
attempt for varying ages. The gray shaded region shows the 95% confidence interval of the marginal effect of relatedness. The horizontal solid red line shows
where the marginal effect of relatedness is zero. The vertical dashed red line shows the age at which the marginal effect of relatedness is not significantly
different from zero (at 563 d), and the red shaded region shows the region of significance for the marginal effect of relatedness.
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Table S1. Investigating the effect of mean pairwise relatedness to dominants (males and females older than 3 y) on eviction
Model Response Fixed effect β SE χ2 P
Female Probability of a female being targeted
for eviction
Intercept −1.53 1.81
Relatedness to dominants, males and females >3 y 9.95 3.36 9.51 0.002
Age, d −0.003 0.0005 39.98 <0.0001
Weight, g 0.002 0.001 2.59 0.11
Pregnancy status −0.61 0.49 1.63 0.20
Rainfall, mm −0.08 0.18 0.21 0.65
Group size 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.63
Male Probability of a male being targeted for
eviction in a mixed-sex eviction attempt
Intercept −5.01 2.88
Relatedness to dominants, males and females >3 y 0.84 3.08 0.07 0.79
Age, d −0.0004 0.0003 2.12 0.15
Weight, g 0.002 0.002 1.65 0.20
Male breeding status −0.43 0.49 0.80 0.37
Rainfall, mm 0.16 0.20 0.57 0.45
Group size 0.03 0.04 0.42 0.52
Shown are models predicting the probability of being targeted for eviction for females (GLMM, n = 207 females in 29 eviction attempts in five groups) and
males (GLMM, n = 177 males in 15 eviction attempts in five groups). Models were fitted using a binomial error structure and logit-link function and with
individual ID, eviction attempt, and group as random intercepts. Significant terms are in boldface type.
Table S2. Investigating the effect of mean pairwise relatedness to known primary aggressors on eviction
Model Response Fixed effect β SE χ2 P
Female Probability of a female being targeted
for eviction
Intercept 2.99 2.87
Relatedness to primary aggressors 5.47 2.87 3.85 0.0498
Age, d −0.002 0.0006 12.85 <0.001
Weight, g −0.0005 0.002 0.06 0.80
Pregnancy status −1.07 0.68 2.72 0.10
Rainfall, mm −0.29 0.26 1.28 0.26
Group size 0.03 0.04 0.33 0.57
Male Probability of a male being targeted for
eviction in a mixed-sex eviction attempt
Intercept −5.28 1.32
Relatedness to primary aggressors 2.30 3.24 0.54 0.46
Age, d −0.0001 0.0004 0.06 0.80
Weight, grams 0.002 0.002 0.64 0.42
Male breeding status −0.58 0.64 0.86 0.35
Rainfall, mm 0.21 0.24 0.74 0.39
Group size 0.06 0.05 1.52 0.22
Shown are models predicting the probability of being targeted for eviction for females (GLMM, n = 131 females in 19 eviction attempts in 4 groups) and
males (GLMM, n = 130 males in 11 eviction attempts in 4 groups). Models were fitted using a binomial error structure and logit-link function and with
individual ID, eviction attempt, and group as random intercepts. Significant terms are in boldface type.
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Table S3. Investigating the effect of mean pairwise relatedness to same-sex and opposite-sex dominants (individuals older than 3 y) on
eviction
Model Response Fixed effect β SE χ2 P
Female Probability of a female being targeted
for eviction
Intercept 0.39 1.72
Relatedness to male dominants, males >3 y 3.69 2.55 2.09 0.15
Age, d −0.002 0.005 34.49 <0.0001
Weight, g 0.002 0.001 0.66 0.20
Pregnancy status −0.67 0.50 1.91 0.17
Rainfall, mm −0.03 0.18 0.021 0.88
Group size 0.002 0.04 0.001 0.98
Female Probability of a female being targeted
for eviction
Intercept −0.01 1.78
Relatedness to female dominants, females >3 y 5.10 2.65 4.07 0.044
Age, d −0.002 0.0005 32.58 <0.0001
Weight, g 0.002 0.001 1.80 0.18
Pregnancy status −0.59 0.51 1.45 0.23
Rainfall, mm −0.05 0.18 0.06 0.81
Group size 0.0004 0.04 −0.01 1.00
Male Probability of a male being targeted for
eviction in a mixed-sex eviction attempt
Intercept −4.90 2.93
Relatedness to male dominants, males >3 y −0.82 2.87 0.08 0.77
Age, d −0.0004 0.0003 2.41 0.12
Weight, g 0.002 0.002 1.70 0.19
Male breeding status −0.48 0.49 0.97 0.33
Rainfall, mm 0.18 0.20 0.71 0.40
Group size 0.03 0.04 0.48 0.49
Male Probability of a male being targeted for
eviction in a mixed-sex eviction attempt
Intercept −5.34 2.84
Relatedness to female dominants, females >3 y 2.88 2.50 1.41 0.24
Age, d −0.0003 0.0003 1.26 0.26
Weight, g 0.002 0.002 1.78 0.18
Male breeding status −0.47 0.50 0.89 0.35
Rainfall, mm 0.11 0.22 0.25 0.62
Group size 0.02 0.04 0.34 0.56
Shown are models predicting the probability of being targeted for eviction for females (GLMM, n = 198 females in 27 eviction attempts in five groups) and
males (GLMM, n = 177 males in 15 eviction attempts in five groups). Models were fitted using a binomial error structure and logit-link function and with
individual ID, eviction attempt, and group as random intercepts. Significant terms are in boldface type.
Table S4. Sex-specific aggression during eviction attempts
Fixed effect β SE χ2 P
Intercept 0.93 0.17
Sex of primary aggressor* −1.89 0.48
Eviction type† −0.28 0.27
Sex of primary aggressor* × eviction
type†
1.80 0.56 12.48 <0.001
Shown is a model predicting the number of male and female primary
aggressors in female-only and mixed-sex eviction attempts (GLMM, n =
26 eviction attempts in six groups). The model was fitted using a Poisson
error structure and a log-link function and with eviction attempt and group
as random intercepts. Significant terms are in boldface type.
*Reference level: males.
†Reference level: mixed-sex eviction attempt.
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Table S5. Investigating whether closer relatives inflict higher reproductive costs on dominants
Response Fixed effect β SE χ2 P
No. of emergent pups to which a
dominant female (aged over 3 y)
is assigned maternity
Intercept −1.57 0.37
Relatedness to female cobreeder −0.06 0.12 0.23 0.63
Female cobreeder age, d 0.000002 0.00003 −0.004 1.00
No. of breeding females 0.04 0.06 0.55 0.46
Dominant female age, d 0.0001 0.00009 1.63 0.20
Rainfall, mm −0.08 0.06 1.66 0.20
Relatedness to female cobreeder × female
cobreeder age
0.00002 0.0002 −0.07 1.00
Proportion of emergent litter to which
a dominant female (aged over 3 y) is
assigned maternity
Intercept −0.3 0.20
Relatedness to female cobreeder −0.08 0.14 0.27 0.60
Female cobreeder age, d −0.00003 0.00004 0.53 0.47
No. of breeding females −0.20 0.03 58.58 <0.0001
Dominant female age, d 0.0002 0.00007 11.93 <0.001
Rainfall, mm −0.06 0.03 4.40 0.036
Relatedness to female cobreeder × female
cobreeder age
−0.00005 0.0002 0.08 0.78
Shown are models predicting the number of emergent pups to which each dominant breeding female is assigned maternity (GLMM, n = 2,719 pairs of
dominant females and female cobreeders, involving 131 dominant females giving birth to 337 litters in 17 groups) and the proportion of an emergent litter to
which each dominant breeding female is assigned maternity (GLMM, n = 2,719 pairs of dominant females and female cobreeders, involving 131 dominant
females giving birth to 337 litters in 17 groups). Models were fitted using a Poisson error structure and log-link function and a binomial error structure
and logit-link function, respectively. Dominant female, cobreeder female, litter, and group ID were included as random intercepts. Significant terms are in
boldface type.
Table S6. Investigating how the effect of relatedness varies with age and weight of
potential evictees
Fixed effect β SE χ2 P
Intercept 5.88 3.31
Relatedness to dominants, males and females >3 y −39.36 19.14
Age, d −0.005 0.001
Weight, g −0.001 0.002
Pregnancy status −0.60 0.52 1.41 0.24
Rainfall, mm −0.10 0.19 0.20 0.65
Group size −0.0003 0.04 −0.08 1.00
Relatedness to dominants, males and females >3 y, × age, d 0.008 0.004 5.98 0.014
Relatedness to dominants, males and females >3 y, × weight, g 0.03 0.02 5.63 0.018
Shown is a model predicting the probability of being targeted for eviction for females (GLMM, n = 207 fe-
males in 29 eviction attempts in five groups). The model was fitted using a binomial error structure and logit-
link function and with female ID, eviction attempt, and group as random intercepts. Significant terms are in
boldface type.
Table S7. Investigating whether negative kin discrimination depends on the recipient’s
capacity to resist
Fixed effect β SE χ2 P
Intercept 0.39 1.29
Mother’s relatedness to female dominants, females >3 y −0.64 2.00 0.10 0.75
Mother’s age, d −0.0002 0.0005 0.26 0.61
Rainfall, mm 0.29 0.23 2.01 0.16
Group size −0.04 0.04 0.95 0.33
Shown is a model predicting the probability of a female’s litter being killed in an infanticidal attack by
dominant females in the first week after birth (GLMM, n = 57 females giving birth to 50 communal litters in
11 groups). The model was fitted using a binomial error structure and logit-link function and with female ID,
litter, and group as random intercepts.
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Table S8. Investigating whether resistance offered by the recipient decreases as
relatedness increases
Fixed effect β SE χ2 P
Intercept −4.09 1.95
Relatedness to dominants, males and females >3 y 23.36 9.76
Age, d 0.004 0.002
Relatedness to dominants, males and females >3 y, × age, d −0.03 0.01 5.96 0.015
Shown is a model predicting the probability of targeted females overcoming efforts to permanently evict
them (GLMM, n = 76 females in 14 eviction attempts in four groups). The model was fitted using a binomial
error structure and logit-link function and with female ID, eviction attempt, and group as random intercepts.
Significant terms are in boldface type.
Movie S1. Evictions are violent events and evictees are often left with serious injuries as a result of the aggression they receive. Shown is the highly aggressive
behavior directed at a female that is being targeted for eviction by other members of her group.
Movie S1
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